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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. ~~William~~ Moyers

1. On 21 May I visited Mr. Moyers at the White House at the request of the DDCI. The purpose was to discuss OCI intelligence support of the President.

2. Mr. Moyers asked me a number of questions about the criteria used for preparing the President's Daily Brief and other related topics. In the course of this discussion I was able to make the following points:

a. The best intelligence service for the President can only be provided if we have a way of finding out what the President's interests are. I said that under the Kennedy administration we had been in constant contact with General Clifton and had been able to get from him a stream of "feedback" on the President's reaction and on which topics preoccupied him at the moment. We had very much felt the lack of this playback under Mr. Johnson and felt that we were not serving him as well as we could. I invited Mr. Moyers to call us any time that he felt that the President should see a discussion of any topic in the President's Brief. Mr. Moyers seemed to respond very favorably to this point, and in turn invited me to call him any time we needed advice on whether or not the President would be interested in something.

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b. I told Mr. Moyers that a major problem in making up the President's Brief was the inclusion of items of "intelligence warning"; it was possible for us to write fifty pages a day, thereby taking out insurance for us against any possible contingency, but this would not really serve the President. We try, therefore, to be highly selective in inclusion of warning of coups and the like. Mr. Moyers said he understood what our difficulties were.

c. I told him that we had two choices in preparing the President's material. We could confine ourselves strictly to intelligence materials; State would report on its own activities and Defense on its own and the press would flow in independently. Alternatively, we could play a wider role by trying to meld the output of all government agencies and the press into a sort of classified newspaper which would give the President a coherent account of events. However, this would inevitably mean that the President would have to read some things twice. Mr. Moyers said by all means to meld all sources, and urged us as well to include "some analysis."

Tell DCI what you think about the particular

3. He said that the President read the President's Brief "avidly" but did not find the CIB of much use. He said that the President also read the Dominican situation reports and spot reports and found them satisfactory.

C. Wright

4. I told Mr. Moyers that we in OCI prided ourselves on having an organization capable of very quick response and of changing its way of doing business overnight. If at any time the President wanted something different, all he had to

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do was let us know. Mr. Moyers said he felt that things were going satisfactorily at the moment, and the only advice he could give us was to stay loose.

5. Mr. Moyers said that he had tried to read the entire CIA output on the Dominican Republic but had soon been swamped and had given up. Nonetheless, I gained the impression that Mr. Moyers' role in the Dominican situation in particular and in national security affairs in general is to be more permanent than I would have thought from my earlier conversation with Bromley Smith.

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RL:yd

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